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1. latrodactiop. 
The a-- that w are talltia& about are two per80ll, aero--
a- that ruult 1a u Bftcler Mi1la either tilled or oot tilled by 
an Attacker,,- Si.Dee the Attacker _,1oya a weapon that requires a 
certaia -=t of t:lme T for delivery, a -jor part of hia task 
ia the prediction of what the Evader rill do during the next T, 
• tbat u equally gooCI nae for h:la wuld be ''Predictor." 
!he claNic _..ple of auch a gaae ia "bcmber va. battleship." 
!he bomber ia aa8Wled to have one boab, infinite endurance, and per-
fect aia, ao that the battleahip'a only chance of survival lies in 
the bcmber'a inability to predict the 110tion of the battleship 
duri.111 the oat T. The ,_. ia trivial if the battleabip lmova 
the t:lme at which the·bcmb ia dropped; both the bollb and t.oe battle-
abip ahould be placed randoaly within whatever area A the battleahip 
cu reach 1a T, and the payoff ia the ratio of the lethal aru to 
A. If the battl•hip doea not bow when the boab ia dropped, then 
the probl• ia not trivial. We aball diacuaa thia probl• furtber 
ia the aeqae1. 
A more llOclern COU1lterpart of the above .... ia the IC• va. 
trailed ahip ..... where perhapa U9eral iwclear veapou are launched 
in a aurpriae attack qainat aoae aort of naftl. taqet. llaclur 
... pou are very powrful, but a llOclern abip can &180 travel aoae 
dhtaace in balf an hour, ao that the outcome ia not owioua. The 
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probably closer to the real world than they were in the days of 
boabera and battleships, ao that the g•e is of more than acadeadc 
interest. It ia, strictly apealdng, unsolved, as is the ICBM vs. 
railroad train g•e, which 19 the one d:lmenaional equivalent. 
Another exmaple of a T:ble Tagged Evasion Game is the anti-
aircraft gun vs. airplane gaae, where the lethal radius and time 
lag are both scaled dow considerably froa the bomber vs. battle-
•hip. This g•e differs fundamentally from the latter in that the 
AA gun fires at many distinct pointa of time, with the ·times of 
firing bearing little relationship to the maneuvers of the target • 
This distinction results in the IMS error being the appropriate 
payoff and leads to the introduction of filtering techniques. 
The examples above should make it clear that the tiae lag is 
what .. kes these games unique and interesting. It also makes them 
non-intuitive, at least in the sense that nature provides very 
little inatruction in bow to play th•. One can presumably learn 
80!Hthing about pursuit by watching natural predators and their 
prey, and there are many other combat sicuations where nature pro-
vi.du guidelines. But the ability to kill at long range is unique 
to aodern man, and we must therefore expect intuition to be a fallible 
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2. Models Derived from the Bomber vs. Battleship Game. 
We will refer to the Bomber as A and the Battleship as E, 
and we make the following assmptions: 
1) Both sides have infinite endurance. 
2) E's motion is unrestrained except that his speed must 
never exceed V. In particular, E can make sharp 
turns if he likes. 
3) A can warp the shape of the lethal region in ar.:y way 
he likes, so·· long as the area of the region is S. 
It is not intuitively obvious that the above game is difficult. 
In fact, it is clear that A will always have E located to 
· within a circle of radius VT, so that he can achieve a kill prob-
ability of S/w(VT) 2 by simply choosing the lethal region randomly 
within the circle (a wedge of random orientation will do). On the other 
hand, if E maneuvers in such a way that the probability density 
of his position is uniform within the circle of uncertainty at the 
moment of impact, then the kill probability will be S/w(VT) 2 no 
-tter what lethal region A chooses. Therefore, S/w(VT) 2 is 
the value of the game, as long as E can behave as described. The 
trouble with this analysis is that E cannot make the probability 
density of his position increment uniform at the. moment of impact. 
It would be easy if E knew when the bomb was dropped because his 
aaauaed ability to make sharp turns would permit hia to siaply pick 
a point at random within the circle of uncertainty and go there • 
But E doesn't have that critical piece of information, and there-
fore doesn't know when to start the maneuver. Still, intuition aay 
-
4 
argue that E can achieve the same effect by ''moving around com-
pletely at random all the time." Unfortunately, this instruction is 
not specific, and attempts to make it specific lead to non-un!form 
distributions at certain times. 
To illuati:ate how this happens, we consider the following 
strategy for E in the one dimensional analog (Bomber vs. Railroad 
Train), where S is now a length, rather than an area: At time 
O(t-0) pick a velocity uniformly from [-V,V], and stick to it for 
T. This will certainly make the position at T unifona throughout 
the interval of uncertainty. At T, repeat the procedure with an 
independent choice of velocity, and continue ad infinitum. Let us 
explore the consequences of this policy. At t:lae T/'I., the incre-
ment to E!s position over the next T 
v1 and v2 are the first two randca velocities. Since the veloci-
ties are independent, the probabili.ty density of the sua can be 
found by convolving the uniform density with itself. The result 
ia tr:laugular, and is shown as one of the densities in Figure lA. 
If this policy for E were optimal, be could announce it to 
A without hurting his chances (A can figure it out for hiaaelf 
anyway, since he has lots of t:lae available). In response, A 
•iaht use the firing policy "straddle the present position." If 
S •VT, it can be seen that this policy would cut out 3/4 of the 
probability density function at t • T/2, so the highest kill 
probability ia at least 3/4. Figure lB is a plot of kill proba-
bility (P~) vs. t:lae. It shows that 
• l!"lllllllll ................................ -IU1191111111•A*..-.· -·--••.,.,-4.,..,,,_..-..--~~- --.-- -~ f s: u p;4 u;a 41 . a ca un £JA 2 aaz :e; u : 
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1) The highest PK available is 3/4. 
2) PK • l/2(•S/2VT) is available only at multiples of T. 
3) The average kill probability is closer to 3/4 than to 
1/2, since the scallops are concave. 
In other words, the stated strategy for E does not make 
the I-increment of his position "uniform all the t:lme." 
A has a better strategy than straddling that involves extrap-
,· 
olation. Specifically, at t:lme t • 6, will have observed the first 
velocity v1 , and can cpnsequently predict exactly where E will 
be at T. By killing an interval of length 2V6 around that point. 
he can guarantee a kill, and since 6 is arbitrary, A can guar-
antee a kill as long as S > 0 (assuming a noiseless tracking system 
that is able to measure a velocity in an arbitrarily small amount 
of t:lme). Thus, by paying careful attention to E's track, A can 
actually guarantee to kill E if E uses the stated policy. 
Obviously, the trouble with E's strategy is that his motion 
is predictable over long periods of t:lme; once he picks a velocity, 
he sticks to it for T. A natural way to :Improve E's strategy is 
to make many independent velocity decisions within each T, rather 
than just one. Intuition may lead to the conclusion that, if E 
makes enough of these incremental decisions within each interval, 
then the I-increment of his position C1t) will be uniform for 
all t. This is false; what actually happens is that E can reli-
ably be expected to not go anywhere. If there are N independent 1 
identically distributed velocity choices Vi in T, then 
i 
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eo that Ua Var(l.r) • O. C:O.equently, thU eort of •trauay will 
.... 
aao lead to l's beiaa killed with probability 1 even wha S 
ta TerY ..all. 
Hot only have we failed to discover a strategy for E that 
will paratee ~ ~ S/ (M), but we have failed to procluce a 
•trateay for E that will perait him to survive with any podtive 
probability, eve11 against a weak opponeut. E Se98 to be caught 
in a dil..a betwee11 turning infraquently,in which case he is vul-
nerable to aiaple extrapolation, and turning frequently, in which 
cue he baa to fight the Lav of Large lhmbera. ID addition, be ia 
handicapped by the fact that A cao wait for a wad•• of ~ 
before he firea, aiace A has infinite endurance and can drop the 
bomb whenever he likes. 
The previous paragraphs 1'ill have served their purpose if the 
reader is now convinced that the gaae is not staple, arad that 
''ilovioa around at raadoa" will. not parantee that Px s S/(M) 
2 (or p~ s S/w(VT) in twO d:laenaiona). 
2.1 A 1ea8onable Bvader Strat!IJ· 
Since A can be expected to pick the vd- of the PK 
va. t curve, a reasonable •trategy for E is to behave in euch 
a ~ that Pc doea not depend on t; i.e., the curve is flat. 






choices at times corresponding to the jumps in a Poisson Process. 
Thia follows from the fact that in a Poisson Process the time until 
the ne:i.:t jump is always an exponential random variable with mean 
l/"A, regardless of when jumps have occurred in the past. The 
T-increment of E's position follows a probability law that does 
not depend on t, anci the constant kill probability can be found 
by maxiaizing the amoUnt of probability that A can "cut out" with 
S. In one dimension, E is left with the single parameter A · with 
which to minillize that mu:fnum (the "turn probability".at each 
decision point can be taken to be 1.0, since a smaller number ia 
equivalent to changing A). In tWo dimensions, E controls both 
A and the comion D.F. F(8) of the successive direction changes. 
In one d:laenaion, the probability density of random variable 
X • IT/(VT) is (1) 
where a • "AT, 1x is the modified Beaeel function of order K, 
and the positive direction for x is the last direction of travel 
(-1 ~ x ~ 1) • The 6-function term correaponda to the probability 
e -a that E will not turn at all in T. Figure 2 ahova plots of 
the continuous part of fX(x) for 3 values of a, the opthaal. 
area for A to cut out in each case when S •VT, and the 
associated pK (A also covers the single point x • 1, getting 
• 
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e -a at DO coat). Figure 3 shows plC. vs. a when S • VTi the 
beat a is 2.3, and the ainimum pK is about 2/3. Note that 
a i• the expected nUllber of turns within any period of length T; 
too few turns leads to vulnerability to extrapolation (e-a is 
large), and too aany turns leads to trouble with the Law of Large 
Hwlbers (fx(x) becomes concentrated around x • 0). The optimum 
a decrease• with s;· it is a curious fact that E exhibits the 
110•t frantic behavior against the weakest opponent. 
2.1.1 Approxillation for Weak Attacker. 
The aiDllAX p~ is a function of the ratio S/(2VT) : s. 
There is DO analytic representation in general, but it is po88ible 
to obtain a 11.aiting fora for 811811 s. To do so, we first obtain 
the symmetrical form of (1) that results from rando2izing E's 
first 110ve; the resulting advantage for E will be negligible when 
a is large. The resulting density function is l/2(fX(x) + fx(-x)), 
the continuous part of which is 
Since the power series for 11 has no constant tera, f(x) is 
decr ... ing for x ~ O, and the best strategy for A i• therefore 
to straddle the origin in addition to hitting the points -1 and 
+1. An asyr:.ptotic expansion for ~(z) is 
(2) 
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so that f(O) = ;:{; for large a. For the aio.ent, we asame 
that f(x) is well approximated by f(O) within the straddle, so 
that the kill probability for given a, a is approximately 
where e-a is the probability that no turn will be made. 
(3) 
lor convenience, let x • ....!_ and v2 • a. Then the minimum 
!ii" -v2 . kill probability is pit• min (e + 2xlci°) • ain (e + 2vx). 
a::tO v::tO -v2 
Equating the v-derivative to 0, we find that x • ve and 
-v2 -v2 pit • e (1 + 2v2). There will be two solutions to x • ve 
if x.:: ..!.. e-112, and none otherwise. Only the larger of the two 
12 
solutions can be a ainimma, since the initial slope is positive. 
In other words, p(x) could be generated par-etrically for small 
x by using large values for v. But it is possible to obtain an 
1 + 2v2 
explicit solution. Let y • plt/x. Then y • v , which nuaber 
&:" 1...:!:...!.12-e is never less than .. a. Solving for v, we find that v • 4 . , 
-v2 
taking the larger of the two roots. Since x • ve , ve therefore 
have 






Ila• • • .s, we earlier found that the correct kill proba-
bility i• .665 at a • 2.3. For • • .S, (4) give• x • .2, 
v2 • 1.8, y • 3.42, and pK • .685, thus advising E to turn 
80m8Wbat leaa frequently than he ought to, and slightly exaggerat-
ing the •fn1.,.. kill probability. 
When lit is very mull, y ia very large. If we approlltiJlate 
v with y/2 and !pore the log v tent in (4), the reault ia 
y :::: U-log lit. hcalling that y • p.,/llt and x • s//f.i, thia ia 
p • 2(fi,;Jliogm' - log s 
K 2w 
• .796 al.92 - logs (S) 
I aigbt have hoped for better, since the kill probability would be 
only a U he could achieve the ideal· of aalting hie position 
increment a uniform randoa variable. 
When I UH& the specified a, f(O) is a good approximation 
to f(llt) within the straddle. To prove tbis, note that 
f"(O)/f'(O) •ca, ao that lia a2f"(O)/f'(O) • lia c'a(/cl e1 ) 2 • O. 
2.2 The Probl- in ho Dillenaiona. 
In two 4illenaiou, I controla a directional D.r. F(8), u 
vel.l u the rate oi turning A. The probl• of finding the: proba-
bility law for the T-increlleDt of the Evader'• poeition i• unaolved, 









In this case, the joint density function of 
is (2) 
f ( ) e -a.S(y).S(x-1) + J!.. ..1_ e -a(l-1.i-xZ::yz) X,Y x,y • 2w 1-x 
for x2 + y2 a: 1 1 where the positive x direction is the last 
direction of travel, and a • AT as before. By numerically inte-
grating this function, and minimizing the integral with respect to 
a, Figure 4 can be computed. That figure represents the current 
"state of the art" as far as the Bomber vs. Battleship gaae is 
concerned; value of the game (assuming one exists) is a survival 
probability (1-pK) somewhere between the upper and lower bounds 
that are shown. It is not known whether or not the optimal strategy 
for E is a Poisson Strategy of the type just considered, or even 
whether the uniform distribution on angles is optimal within the 
class. 
2.3 The Discrete Evasion Galle. 
The lollber vs. Battleship game discus9ed above was the subject 
of some effort at the llARD Corporation in the 1950's. Finding the 
game to be too difficult for exact solution, Isaacs and others 
decided to formal.ate approximate ga11es that could be solved exactly, 
rather than to try to approximate the value of the exact ga.e. In 
Iaaacs'worda (3) 1 
.. 
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"To gain a foothold, we simplified it further. We made 
the ocean one-dimensional and discrete. That is, we 
supposed the battleship to be located on one of a long 
row of points and at each unit of time he hops to one 
adjoining one, enjoying the sole choice of a right or 
left jump. The time lag was to be an integral number n 
of time units, or-the same thing-of jumps. This is 
tantamount to saying that the bomber knows all positions 
of the battleship which precede his present one by n 
jumps or more. If n • 1, the bomber knows all but the 
most recent of the ship's positions and there are but two 
poss~bilities for that: one space to right or left of the 
last observed one. 
'· 
12 
This case--n • 1-·is trivial. The ship makes each decision-
left or right-by the toss of a coin. The bomber can bomb 
at any time and when he does he also decides between the 
two possibilities with a coin.* Then the value of the game 
(hit probability) is 1/2. 
Our intention was now to take up n • 2,3,4,... and, from 
·the knowledge gained, proceed to the continuous case. 
Thence we hoped to restore planarity to the ocean and 
approach practicality by more realistic assumptions about 
the ship's kinematics, accuracy of the bomber, number of 
bombs, etc. 
But the cue of n • 2 proved to be an incubus. A consid-
erable amount of effort by several people was expended before 
its shell began to crack. This paper will be the third one 
devoted to it; see (1,2). We can expect the general class 
of aiming-and-evasion problems to be more difficult than 
anticipated, but by no means hopeless." 
*(For the game theory tyro only.) If at some time, the ship 
elected, say, the probabilities: Left: .6; Right: .4, 
the bomber need only wait for this time and bomb on the 
left; then hit probability • .6. Similar considerations 
hold vice versa. Thus the unique optimal strategies 





The reader ls referred to (3) for a complete dlscussion of 
the case n • 2. Briefly, the solution was found by beginniDg with 
the intuitively plausible Markov Hypothesis: In the n step game, 
the probability that E will go right or left on any given llOV~ 
may depend on the previous n - 1 steps, but will not depend on 
steps further in the past than the n - 18 t. The assumption ls 
plausible because, ''Wily should E let hls behavior depend on infor-
mation that A already knows?" Note that the assumption bolds 
when n • r, since E flips a coin each time regardless of what 
be did the previous time. When n • 2, E will presumably maintain 
a constant probability of turning (x), since one can "turn" know-
ing only what was done on the previous step. E's direction of 
travel can then be extrapolated for 2 steps with probability 
(l-x)2. With probability x(l-x), E will be at the opposite 
extreme in 2 steps. This leaves a probability of 1 - (l-x)2 -
x(l-x) • x for the center point (no net movement). Thus, E can 
guarantee a kill probability no larger than 
V • min max {(l-x)2, x, x(l-x)}. 
~ 
The minimum. occurs when x • (l-x)2, in which case x - 3 - rs -2 
.382 • V. This nUll'ber turns out to be the value of the gae, but 
the proof of the fact is not easy. Three different proofs can be 
found in (3), (4), and (5). The proofs are made somewhat difficult 
.• ·- 'I>.&'$ rnsw 
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because the maximizing player has no optimal stragegy; he can 
guarantee a pK arbitrarily close to V, but he can't guarantee 
V. Intuitively, A has no optimal strategy because it alway• pays 
to wait a little longer before firing, but it doesn't pay to wait 
"forever" before firing-the two rules are in conflict. 
The results for the 2-step game have been extended somewhat. 
3 - rs In [5], Ferguson showed that V • 2 is a special c.ase of 
v • (n2+2-n/ii2+4)/2, where n + 1 is the number of edges connected 
n 
to each vertex in certain special graphs that he calls ~estricted 
n-graphs. For example, a lattice of hexagons is a restricted 2-
graph, and the integers are a restricted !-graph. Since a restricted 
n-graph may have no four-sided figures, the square latt~e is not 
a restricted 3-graph, however. 
In [5], Ferguson also mentions that the outstanding unsolved 
problem is the 3-step evasion game. He claims that the best E 
can do using the Markov Hypothesis is (9/3-15)/2 • .294 ••• , but 
(in his words), "It is unknown whether or not this ••• is optimal. 
In fact, it has been conjectured that no strategy with finite 
memory (that is, a strategy that depends only on the last m moves 
for some finite integer m) is optimal for the three-move lag 
problem." Thus, the Markov Hypothesis has not only not been proved 
(except for n • 1,2), but its truth is actually in doubt. Before 
exploring the reason for this doubt, however, we will first inves-
tigate the numbers V that are obtained as "game values" when the 
n 
Markov Hypothesis is employed in the n-step evasion game. 
Ii 
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According to the Markov Hypothesis E controla 2n-l 
variables, each being the p1oba,,ility of going (say) to the right, 
given that the previous n - 1 steps have been in a certain 
sequence. We can exploit the obvious right/left symmetry by con-
sidering only paths where the last step is to the (say) left, in 
n-2 which case there are only 2 variables at E's disposal. Equi-
valently, the variabl~ can be regardu as probabilities of turniog 
n-2 given one of the 2 possible previous sequences of turns. Por 
each of these sequences, E must assure that the probability of 





V ~ ain max a-2 
n 211-2 variables of 2 variables 
n-2 In general, we can expect that about 2 + 1 of the 
functions will be equal when the variabl88 are optimua, since this 
establishes as •ny equations as unknoWD8, with the rest of the 
functions taking on smaller values. Evidently, the "controlling 
functions" (the ones that are equal) will become a -1.ler propor-
tion of all functions as n grows large. Some idea of vlUch 
functions will be controlling can be obtained by em1nina in 
detail the results for the 2, 3, and 4 step a-a, which 
* are shown in F1.gurea 5 and 6. The results for n • 2 are IA&ca'. 












~¥\ . ..... • • •i;;cc .A 
.n . f. 2 J S .WI& d ¥PPWG4 41 p ;q; ·"'! 





The results for n • 3 are Ferguson's. The results for n • 4 
are new. The probabilities shown in Figures 5 and 6 are the prob-
abilities that E will be at the various points when using the 
associated optimal turn probabilities; PCtlTN) is "the probability 
of turning if the previous move was a turn and the move before that 
was not." The controlling functions are the ones that are equal to 
the bound on the game value (underlined) in the optimal solution. 
The four step game shows that the following two propositions 
are false: 
1) When E uses bis optimal (Markov) strategy, A's choice 
of when t<" fire is iDlllaterial (A must not fire after 
NH), 
2) In E'• optimal strategy, the probability of turning 
depend• only on the time since the last turn 
(P(TjTr) ~ P(TjTR)). 
On the other band, one striking characteristic of the 4-step 
game is that the optillal turn probabilities are all very nearly 
equal, so that the approximation resulting from the assumption that 
they are equal ldgbt not be a bad one. At n • 4, the best single 
turn probability is .3015 ••• , with the resulting bound being 
.2380 •••• For large n, assuming that there is a constant turn prob-
ability at each step, the time between turns would be approximately 
exponentially distributed, so that formula (1) should apply. How-
ever, formula (5) gives too large a kill probability (.32 at n • 4) 
because the e -a term is free to A in the continuous ga.e, whereas 
f Jt - I zc; Al £.Uii aw a s a a : 2a u _ a a. a: a 
2 - STEP 
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FIGURE 5. 
THE r•o AMO THREE STEP GAMES. 
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4 - STEP 
.2508 .2388 .25 73 .1888 .1055 
.2374 .2371 .2371 .1844 .1055 
p (TIT T) • . 30318 
p (TI NT) • . 30318 
p (TI NN ) • . 30318 
p (TI TN) • . 29833 
FIGURE 6. 
.2374 .2374 .23 74 .1882 .1018 
.2374 .2371 .2371 .1801 .1055 
. 2 s v s .23 740 
4 
THE FOUR STEP GAME. 
.. 
au EJ EJ£)U ZP . 1 . se : a ;; : a; .ax u a a a as •• 
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it u not iD the ducre.te ..-. In the ducrete ~· (3) •bould 
be replaced by 
-a 2 ~ p(a) • max {e , u+1 'f; } (6) 
which is •fn:l•ized when .the two quantities are equal. A foraula 
for ~· wfnf•w (~) -. u a function of D can be found by au 
:auJ.r~u .•iailar to tbat leading to cs>. Firat, let x • ..!1 12/T. 
~ ~ • 8 -QI X • e-Q//01 Y ;: ··~.'X • ra t. and C~equently 
(7) 
For n • 4 1 (7) gi.vu p~ • .202 1 vhich ia too law. Yb• 
n 18 very large, the log y term in (7) can be neglected, givillg 
p~ s= xi-log x, or 
p~ • ~ ..!1 .,{og I + log (n+l) 
- (.796) ..!1 l.22 +log (n+l) (8) 
Collpare (8) aad (5) for a • l/(n+l). 
Di8cr•t• B9uion C:-a with the number of aiaultaD90Ua 
attacker abota bein& larger than 1 bave not been invutipted. 
B'• •trategy ia aeaeitift to tbi8 amber; in the 2-.tep , ... , for 




:lutaace, the a- value when A ba• 2 ebot• (Pina the Markov 
Bypotheaia) ia 
1 - aas llin{(l-z)2, z, z(l-x)}. 
z 
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The optiul z ia • 5, which i• larger than the • 382. • • that 
I Pe• when A only ha. 1 ebot. Note that I turna 90re often 
ap:lut the •troqer opponent; thi• ia in contrut to hie behaviour 
in the continuous vereion of the gaae if he ia rutricted to a.po-
nentially distributed tfaes between turns. 
It vae 9elltioned earlier that there ia 11011e doubt tbat the 
Markov Bypotheeis ia true for n ~ 3. The next section should 
provide SOiie :luight into the ruaons for this doubt. 
,,,, 
l 
... •"T : ~.:?.. .:-_.!_·~· ·· ... : ·.~·. 
' .. ~" ' ,:-' :f_:. .. ' 
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3. · .,,,_,. Prtdietiop Gau. 
Oae of the thin&• that ca11plicatu Evasion Gau la the 
fact that thel'e are *DJ d18t1Dct eequeacu of llOVes that lead to 
eecb of the n + 1 point• reachable in n steps, except for the 
2 au- pointe. Thia complication 18 lli••ina in Paiaaion Predic-
tioa a-.; the Attacker (w will now call bia the Predictor) wine 
..i ... the 11111.tt•r (hacler) -1.te a epecific eequence of character• 
~iatelJ af~ the Predictor "firu." llote that euch 181188 are 
Utft.al if the specific sequence 18 all the •- character, since 
B vlll ..S.t the character continually and win. E - P ga11ea were 
introduced bJ Blackwell (6), vbo obeerved that theoreu of Wald 
and Karlin fllply that eliahtly more aeaeral gaea have a value, and 
that B baa a good etrateay that 18 stationary in the foll.oving 
._.e: Let A be the finite alphabet of character•, and let e 
n 
be 88J 8eqa8Dee of il character•. Then E baa an optiMl etrategy 
P(•) such that P(en) 18 the probability that the firet n 
cbaractera will be 
equation sa,.. that 
en, and aleo P(en) ·J_:<x,eD).* the lut 
e 18 juat as likely to be eaittecl at step 2 
n 
aa it le at etep 1, and the at:atement easily aenerali&ea to etep I'.. 
Blaclmell goe• on to solve the EPlO 1- (the eequence 
1 18 {1,0}) , finding that the value of the a- 18 i• and that an 
optiMl etratqy for I :la therefore to cbooH each character by 
to .. 111& a coin. Rote that thle etratea1 for I le Markov (no 
* llaclmell'• proof 18 for A• {O,l}, but the aenerali&atf.on le 
straiahtforvard. 
" ......... ,,. 
' 
' \ r 
I 
I 
aemory required) •• well as stationary. P 1'&• oul.J .E-optiMl 
•tratq:la. 
In [7) • Matula carried on the nudy of IP 1-.. Be 
20 
found that the aiae of the alphabet :la unimportant aa loog as the 
liat of characters that P 11U9t predict will oat occur ia "eal.f-
di•joint" in the aenae that ao teminal aepent is identical to 
any initial aepent. .Jor euaple, 1100 :la aelf disjoint, but 101 
ia apt. If there are A ~ 2 characters in the self disjoint list, 
1 1 A-1 
then the value of the .... is v,. - r (1 - r> • ~h is asymp-
totic to 1/(Ae). It is intereating to note that the value of the 
g.-e would be l/A if P were denied all Wormation about B's 
emiasiona 9 •o that the value of information can be uactly aaauaed 
The atrategiea used by P and B in guaranteeing V are 
of considerable interest. The Predictor i&norea B's -1.asious 
escept that he taltu note of those iutant• of time tj when B baa 
jll9t coapleted a trauaiaaion of the liat. with t • 0 beina aucb 
a t:I•· At each auch 110me11t, if be baa not yet aade hia predic-
ti.on, P picb a rancloa DUlber X with P(X•i) • pi• 
i • 0 91,.... If the next c011plete tr.....Uaion of the liat baa 
not occurred by tt.e tj + X, than I predict• that the next A 
cbaractera after tj+ X will aot k tha liat; otherwiae, P 
repeata the procedure. Let ~ • tj+l - tj. Tb-. ~~A. aiDc• 
the li•t ia aelf diajoint. The probability that P will aake a 
'l 
f 
pa ! a 12$ I U: U J @! ¥ 22 22 I XI SJ.SUE auza: LJ#Aii £$ ;:c -
~.1.-.r~fJ• 
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prediction 1a p0 + ••• + plt-l' and the probability tbat P will 
loae, given that he predicts, is pK-/ (p0+ ••• +pK-l). Therefore, 
if t~e.probabilitiea p1 are chosen in such a aaaner that 
•x-x ·"- •(p0+ .... +pK_1> for all It ::i: >., then 8 is a bound on 
the sm-· ftlue enforcealtle by P. Matula shon that such "diatri-
b .. t:loo bounded deDSities" exist if 8 > v).. but not if 8 - v).. 
lo other word~, these -.deuitiea are E-optmal strategies for P • 
.. _ .. , . /~h•. 84118 D,,1100 will serve to illustrate an optDal 
~tt~~ s~ategy. thttre are fou characten in the llit, which 
we r•""."1.abl• a,.· b, c, and d. E first emits the character 
"a," and then generates a Markov chain with transitioo probabili-
.ti.ea r(bl4L• P(clb) • P(dlc> • 3/4, P(alx> • P(xld) • 1/4 for 
x • a, b, c, d. Note that no •tter what I baa just emitted, he 
1 3 3 
will next emit the list abed with probability 4<4-> • v4, so 
that the given strategy for E (call it S) is optimal. Moreover, 
S is obviously Markov if E's erlssiou ia regarded as a aequeuce 
of lettera, and baa an ultimate stationary distribution. But conaider 
what happens when the letters are translated into O's and l's. 
the generated sequence will still be ultblately stationary, but it 
vill no loaaer be Markovl To show that this is the case, let p 
n 
be the probability that the first n symbols will be "l." Then 
p1 • 1, since the first letter is a, and p2 • 1, since the 
second letter is either a or b. Moreover, p auat satisfy 
n 
1 1 3 Pn+z • <4>Pn + <4>C4)p
11
, and the only solution of thia eq~U.on for 
1'hich pl • Pz • 1 is 
" ..... +Isl .• 
i 
I 
_ . ,~~--.... ·--··--- ---- --------
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P • (! + If? (l+/IT) n-1 + (! - ;f? (l"."Jil) n-1 • (g) 
n 2 13 8 2 13 8 
Since pn+1/pn ia not a constant for n :it ~ for aoae n0 , S 
is not Markov of ·any order. In other words, no finite ae.ory will 
do for I if he attempts to rellelllber only O's and l's. further-
more, Matula proves that all of l's optimal strategies are non-
-. 
Markov in the same sense. This ia iii contrast to the gaaea EPlO 
and BPlOO, where E does have an optimal Markov strategy. Ferguson 
had theae facts in mind when he •de the quote on page 14, to the 
effect that the Markov Hypothesis may not hold for the .3-atep 
evasion ga11e. 
Matula also aolvea certain clasaes of EP gaaes where the 
list ts not self-disjoint, but some EP games have not been solved. 




4. · The Filteri!a:Approacb. 
"Opt:faal.liltering" is concern.ed with the predictioa of a 
aigaal whea it is ae1coapaDied by noise. The source of the noise 1a 
normally thought of aa iapartial,.but there 1a oo reason in the 
theory wily the aoiee could not be deliberately created by E in an 
attempt to make A's job difficult. It aeaa raural, then, to 
atuapt to apply·the theory, which is •ub•tantial, to Bvuion Galea. 
· Cona14er the Evasion Game in one dimension, awl let Xt be 
a •tocllaatic procaa representing E's poaitioll at u.e. t. The 
probability law gowrDiDg the stochastic proceu 18 deteraiaecl by 
I, . aubject to eome conatraints. At tiae t, A will hPe observed 
E's motion up to t, 8ad auat construct a set S(X ,t) with 
u 
Lebea~ .... are· a. 1.a:the·continuouaprobl- or with n pointa 
in·the diacrete probl•~ where S does not depead on X for 
u 
u > t. If A chDoea to fire at time t and if xt+t E s (Xu, t) , 
then A · wtns, ao- tbat die iaterpretatioll of S. 18 !'the set of . 
poJ.nta at which A voulcl fire if be bad to fire at t:IM t." The 
payoff would tbeu be eup P(Xt+t E S(X ,t)). 
t u 
Let us explore.c.e of the difficulties ill appli;ina fil~-
tng theory to the abcMI probl•. The mat obviciua i• tbat A 18 
. * chooeinl a •~. rather chm the ri.ngl.e amber X (t+r) tbat ta 
the "optiMl ·eats.ab'~ in filteriua theory. However, we caa a• 
llrouud t:1de problea by r•tricting A to firing at ui "Jatar¥a1" 





restriction if E nonetheless behaves in such a manner that the 
probability law for xt+t given X , 
u 
u s; t ' is unfwodal. 
There are other difficulties. If A fires at time t, the 
payoff is supposed to be P(f x* (t+t)-X(t+t) I :s:: !>, with an analo-
- ---------gous formula in the discrete case. However, the payoff at t in 
moat of filtering theory is taken to be the variance a~ : 
* Var(X (t+T)-X(t+t)) •.. Furthermore, the usual object to be minimized 
in filtering theory is E(a~), whereas we have in mind a maximizing 
operation, corresponding to the idea that A picks th~ t:lae of 
firing. The expected value criterion would seem to apply better if 
an impartial referee were to randomly pick the time of firing, rather 
than A. 
All of the above difficulties diaappear if E is restricted 
to using a stationary Gaussian process. Since the distribution of 
given X for u s; t, 
u 
is normal, A's best strategy is 
always to straddle the mean. Furthermore, since the variance of 




actually a constant, so that the average and supremum operations 
is 
give the same result. Since the kill probability at any time is a 
given, decreasing function of a2, the variance itself can serve 
as a payoff function, with E maximizing and A minimizing. In 
other wot:ds, if E is constrained to using stationary• Gaussian 
processes, then filtering theory is applicable to the Evasion Game. 
••-s•s"1•01111;•21111n1a11121z..1111•. "a•t•. •11u•: •&1•t•(ll&IL!ll •."1!! 1211•2112121•,m••1s•-111al!llll ... •••1 _.. __ ,.,. .. ... "'". -----·r--· --~~ 
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· ttDfortuaately, the rules of the Evuion Game make it fapoasible 
for B 'to move •ccording to a stationary, Gaussian process. E's 
vdociey · is supposed to be bounded. We have two cl101cea: 
1) Ignore the problem, aod replace the bound on the 
velocity with a bound on the variance of the velocity. 
In other words, change the game. 
2) Look for E strategies for which the velocity is 
bounded. 
We shall explore both possibilities. 
4.1 Conatrained Variance. 
References [8] and [9] are both applicable. We will follow 
[8], Wherein the discrete and continuous problems are both solved 
complebuy. ·In the discrete case, the velocity Y is aaaimect to 
n 
hold fro'm time n - 1 to time n, ao that, if ~ ia the position 
K 
at time It, ~ • x0 + I Y0 • .The stationary, normal process Y0 
n•l • 
is assdmed to be filtered noise: Y • I ajU -j' where the Uj 
n j-0 n 
are independent, normal random variables with 0 mean and unit 
variance. The variance of Y must never be larger than (say) 1, 
n 
.. 
so Var (Y ) • I aj2 s 1. Thus, a strategy for E is a potentially 
n j-0 
infinite dimensional vector a with a conatrained norm. 
We can assume that A fires at time O, since the firing 
time is :lmiaaterial. If the delay is K steps, corresponding to 
the 1t step Evasion Gaae, then the payoff is Var(~--(Y0,Y_1 , ••• )), 
where - is A's prediction of ~ baaed on what he knew at 





conditional expected value [10). Thia fact does .POt d~ on the 
Uj being normal. However, the fact that the U~ are aonal 
iaplies that the conditional expected value is a Jbear fwctioa. of 
so that it is no restriction to assm1e that 
• 
f>(Y0,Y_l' ••• ) • x0 + j!c, ylJ" Thus, a stra~egy for· A is a vector 
y. Br- goes on to express the pa,off as a.function J(a,y), 
subject to a a:lld reatriction on y, and to show that 
ain au: • au: 1DiD J (a,y) • ---1----
y a a y 2(1.,-cos(~+ln .. (10) 
* Furthermore, a1 • 0 for i :a: It. in E's optfaal strate&1• At 
first glance, this seems to confira the Markov Hypothesis for these 
gaJ1es, since B needs to know only u _. 1 , ••• ,U in order to n-...- D 
determine Y • However, a finite memory will suffice only if B 
D 
remembers U's; no finite memory will suffice if E relU!llbers 
Y's, contrary to the Markov Hypothesis. Thia situation is very like 
the one encountered in Blllliasion-Prediction games; E's finite 
memory is for sc:mething that isn't observable by A. Thia conati-
tutes additional evidence that the Markov Hypothesis does not bold 
in general for the n-atep Evasion G-e. 
* Even though A has an optimal strategy y , the results 
for Br-'s game are aiail.ar to the results for other evasion-type 
* games in the sense that y had infinitely llllDY non-zero components. 
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u.ny C011pODenta ~ correapoadillg to the idea that A can -it a J.ona 
tt.e but not forever before firing• then A 1IOUl.d have only E-
optt.al strategies. 
It ae MDticmed earl:l.er that the chief reamD for r .. trict-
1111 B to normal procuaea is the fact that the tt.e of firias ia 
choeen by A, J:atber than at randoa. Ill acme appli.catiou, the 
tme -Y actually be ®.oaeii at randoa; for iutance. 1a tbe COllftU-
tioDal anti-aircraft probl•. It is reasonable in that case to 
take E(VarCX.:~(Y))) as a payoff, even though it -1 differ froa 
1!f Var((~--(Y)) Ii • y). Since Bram's arguments do aot rely on 
y 
the aorml.ity or coanonneae of the distribution of the U'a, it 
followa that 
1) The independent U's can have arbitrary distributiona 
with uni.t mean and variance. 
2) A can remain restricted to linear functions of the 
Y's. 
3) 1.'he value of the game will be (10). 
Bram also solves the continuous version of the above gaae. 
If T is the time delay, then the value of the game turns out to 
4T2 be ?· It is interesting to compare this result with a siail.ar 
result of Grenander [9], who solves a similar g•e with T • 1 
where A is restricted to using an "extrapolation" prediction rule: 
* X (t+l) • X(t) + k(X(t)-X(t-1)). (11) 






Grenander find• that the value of the game ia 2.1 if It • 1, or 
.82 if A sets It at .12, which ie the optimizing value of It 
for A. Evidently, the game value is eensitive to changes in A'• 
eet of prediction strategies; Grenatider finds an improvement by a 
factor of 2.5 if A is allowed to use values of It other than 
1, and Braa has proved that another factor of 2 ia possible 
(4/w2 • .4) if A's .prediction strategies are unrestricted. 
As mentioned earlier, the chief objection to the constrained 
variance approach is that E's velocity is not necessarily bounded. 
Bounded velocity results are scarcer and less satisfying than con-
strained variance results, but still deserve mention. 
4.2 Bounded Velocity. 
In one dimension, the natural assumption to mate is that E 
travels back and forth at top speed, with the times between direc-
tion changes being independent random variables with coimon D.F. 
F(x). The assumption is "natural" more out of force of habit than 
through any inherent logic, since there is no good reason to suppose 
that E's current decision should be independent of past decisions, 
but it nonetheless offers some hope of analysis. We earlier inves-
tigated the consequences of making F(x) exponential when the 
payoff was a kill probability (p. 6 ). In (9) Grenatider finds the 
optimal D.F. under the assumptions that A is restricted to the 
* extrapolation rule X (t+l) • 2X(t) - X(t-1), and that the value 
* of the game is to be the (average) variance of X(t+l) - X (t+l). 
• 
-a : uca;; as as s ; :: "' di 0 





Be find• that the ti.Ilea between direction changee ebould be geometric: 
1 n 
P(r1 • a) • (2) , n • 1,2,.... which 1a the aae a• uying that E 
flip9 a coin nery time wnt to decide which ny to go next. If 
the top •peed is 1, the value of the gue is l. It ebould be 
empbaai.aed that this game value is an average variance: 
v • E(a~) • E(Var(X(t+l)-x*<t+l))). 
Por the proposed etrategy for E, a~ tUTIUI out to be· t + 6(t ~)2 
for 0 ' t ' 1, with period 1. It is true that J: a: dt • 1 1 
but llin a~ • 1/2, with the latter quantity being the -.ore appro-
t 
pd.ate payoff if A picks the tille of firing. In other words, 
Greaander implicitly asataea that a neutral -agent pick.a the time 
of firing when he adopts E(a~) for a payoff. 
Greu•nder also formulatee several games where A is not 
reetricted to sbaple extrapolation. In one of thea, A is free to 
use the conditional expected value as a predictor, and I movee in 
2 cliJlenaioma at unit speed in a direction -t that is filtered, 
Gaus8ian ooise. Be solves the problem in case V = Var(-t) is 
small, finding that the gaae value (variance of prediction error) 
ta (4r2/y2)v. Rote the afailarity of thb reeult to Br•'• in 





The math .. tical attack on the Bomber ve. Battleahip a- baa been 
proceeded by the two time honored tactics of approx18ately 110lviag 
the actual problem and actually.solving the approxiatata probl ... 
Unfortunately, neither approach baa worked very veil; the upper 
and lower bounde on the actual problem are not very close to each 
other, and the approximate games that have been solved do not re-
aemble the Bomber vs. Battleship game very closely. A great deal 
bas been learned, but the really practical problems have yet to be 
solved. 
One of the moat intriguing questions that remains unanswered 
concerns the Markov Hypothesis for the n-atep Evasion Game. Reaulta 
for similar gaaea indicate that the hypothesis as stated earlier 
probably does not hold, but that E nonetheless has an optimal 
strategy wherein he needs to remember only n - 1 quantities. The 
question is, ''What quantities?, and what is the mapping frail these 
quantities to the actions that E muat take?" 
There are other questions that need to be answered. Yhat 
happens, for instance, if the Attacker's endurance is not large 
compared to the time lag, or if his observations are in llOlle way 
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